As a father, I can't thank you enough [for working to convict sexual predators.] . . . We also want to provide some support for things like DNA testing at the state levels. . . getting the databases set up. . . . [I] t's so important to every family across America and there are just too many horror stories that remind us that we're not doing enough. . . . We insist on justice.
--President Barack Obama (Gerstein 2010) Forensic DNA repositories are gathered by the state without consent and are maintained for the purpose of implicating people in crimes. They signal the potential use of genetic technologies to reinforce the racial order not only by incorporating a biological definition of race but also by imposing genetic regulation on the basis of race.
-- (Roberts 2011): 264-265 I want the country that . . . mapped the human genome to lead a new era of medicine --one that delivers the right treatment at the right time. . . . So tonight, I'm launching a new Precision Medicine Initiative to bring us closer to curing diseases like cancer and diabetes, and to give all of us access to the personalized information we need to keep ourselves and our families healthier.
--President Obama, 2015 State of the Union address
The health department has collected blood, tissues and private health data without legislative authority. If this bill becomes law, we'll never know what they've been collecting or what they've been doing with it. There will be no end to what they can collect, how it could be used, and from whom it may be collected without the individual's knowledge or consent. Public responses to scientific and technological change are important in themselves.
They are also a good case for studying the more general question of how citizens respond as new policy issues and initiatives move into the public arena. Public opinion is not, of course, dispositive in shaping policy choices, but neither is it immaterial. Constituents' views may be especially important to elected officials in the case of issues about which they have no prior record, views, or expertise; absent any history or commitment, politicians may follow their voters' lead on new issues.
This paper engages with the large issue of public responses to scientific innovation through the lens of genomic science, in particular, Americans' views of medical and forensic biobanks. Although only one type of scientific innovation, genomics is a huge topic in its own right. It involves billions, perhaps trillions, of dollars, millions of people, thousands of social implications. Its scope ranges from ancestry testing to dating services to new energy sources to cures for cancer; President Clinton may not have exaggerated in describing the first almostcomplete survey of the human genome as "the most important, most wondrous map ever produced by humankind." And both the science and its uses are very young.
Biobanks offer a useful lens into the politics of genomic science for several reasons.
Substantively, they are powerful inventions that claim not only to advance the fields of medicine and criminal justice but also to help determine crucial questions of life and death.
Analytically, medical and forensic biobanks are similar in theoretically significant ways but also different in ways that are analytically useful. Empirically, we have survey data that enable rich comparisons and provide the capacity to explore why people hold the views they have just registered. And politically, forensic biobanks have a high profile, with intense opposition as well as strong support, so they provide a good case for understanding how a relatively new policy moves into and through public opinion about scientific innovation.
The paper proceeds as follows: We begin with a brief theoretical justification for our focus on the impact of institutionalization, some definitions, and a summary of Americans' views of technological or scientific innovation in general. At the heart of the paper, we compare ways in which medical and forensic biobanks have, or have not, developed deep institutional roots, and analyze the impact of that variation on public opinion. We also explore the views of particularly interesting subgroups, again showing the links between institutional structure and unusually high levels of support or opposition to biobanking.
Survey respondents' open-ended explanations of why they hold particular views of these innovations help us to explore mechanisms driving optimism or pessimism about scientific innovation. We conclude by discussing the intersection of ideology and institutionalization, and suggest ways to expand the study of responses to scientific innovation by comparing views of residents of different nations on aspects of genomics.
Innovations, Institutions, and Opinions
Our central analytic claim is that the timing and nature of institutionalization of a scientific innovation shapes public support and opposition. An innovation with no institutional support offers a free-floating Rorshach test to a survey researcher; people's expressed opinions arguably derive from some general proclivity, from a shallow cue (Converse 1964) , or from randomly sampling among an array of available opinions (Zaller 1992) ]. In contrast, an innovation with an institutional structure that provides visibility, stability, and consequences is more likely to inspire genuine views. A comparison between views of two innovations, one with and one without institutional support, therefore, enables the analyst to get a handle on the old question of the relationship between institutions and ideas [ (Lieberman 2002) ; (Rochon 1998) ; (Skocpol 1985) ].
Our second analytic claim is a refinement of the core claim that institutionalization affects, or even creates, opinions about scientific innovations. In this refinement, citizens' prior views about the activities of other important institutions also influence their response to the more or less institutionalized innovation. Activities that can influence opinions include, though they are not limited to, the policy stances of political parties (Green et al. 2004) , the behavior of public or private agencies, and the injustices created by racial hierarchies (Kinder and Sanders 1996) .
Our framework has affinities with the extensive literatures on policy feedback, agenda setting, and scientific literacy. It builds on them by directly comparing views on two similar innovations that differ in their degree of institutional embeddedness. We seek, that is, to refine rather than to refute both arguments that "policies shape politics" and that "ideas shape the course of history." 
Americans' Views of Scientific Innovation, and of Medical and Forensic Biobanks
Definitions: An article on the "hype and hope" in news media about the promise of genomics provides our core definition of scientific or technological optimism. It is "underestimation and neglect of uncertainty" in favor of "widely shared speculative promise" (Hjorleifsson et al. 2008 ): 379). Other analysts fill in the details: an optimist "is centered on advancement concerns. . . . [He or she is driven] by motivations for attaining growth and supports eager strategies of seeking possible gains even at the risk of committing errors or accepting some loss" (Hazlett et al. 2011) : 77, italics in original).
Technology or scientific pessimism, in contrast, is the overestimation of risk and harmful impact, and insufficient attention to benefits or to people's ability to respond appropriately to risk. A pessimist "is centered on security concerns. . . [and] supports vigilant strategies of protecting against possible losses even at the risk of missing opportunities of potential gains" (Hazlett et al. 2011: 77, italics in original) . The distinction can also be described as risk seeking versus risk aversion, preference for type 1 or type 2 errors, or the proactionary versus the precautionary principle (Fuller and Lipinska 2014) . At its core is the question of the degree to which an individual, group, policy or law, or polity should, at the margin, choose to take risks in the hope that the benefits associated with the risky activity will outweigh the potential costs.
Actors differ both in the risks and benefits that they anticipate and in their propensity to accept greater risks in the hope of greater gains.
Many analysts sharply distinguish science from technology, describing the former as "experimental or theoretical work undertaken primarily to acquire new knowledge of the underlying foundation of phenomena and observable facts," and the latter as "the elaboration and application of the known. Its aim is to convert the possible into the actual, to demonstrate the feasibility of scientific or engineering development, to explore alternative routes and methods for achieving practical ends" [ (Stokes 1997) When castes disappear and classes are brought together, when men are jumbled together and habits, customs, and laws are changing, when new facts impinge and new truths are discovered, when old conceptions vanish and new ones take their place, then the human mind imagines the possibility of an ideal but always fugitive perfection. . . . I meet an American sailor, and I ask him why the vessels of his country are constituted so as not to last for long, and he answers me without hesitation that the art of navigation makes such rapid progress each day, that the most beautiful ship would soon become nearly useless if it lasted beyond a few years.
In these chance words said by a coarse man and in regard to a particular fact, I see the general and systematic idea by which a great people conducts all things. (de Tocqueville 1966 (de Tocqueville (1848 (Pew Research Center 2010) , and will open opportunities for the next generation (GSS 2006 (GSS , 2008 (GSS , 2010 (GSS , 2012 .
Medical and Forensic Biobanks-the Impact of Institutionalization on Optimism:
How do these general, even generic, expressions of optimism about the impact of science and technology translate into views of particular scientific innovations? The answer partly, of course, varies according to the innovation. But it may also vary according to the depth and type of institutionalization of the innovation, which is the focus of this paper. Thus we begin with a scientific innovation that can be described as virtually unmediated -that is, it lacks a systematic structure in either the public or private arenas, has seldom been publicly discussed by political actors or the media, and is almost unknown to Americans. Medical biobanks have these characteristics, and they are especially valuable as a baseline measure because they are comparable to forensic biobanks, which have in fact developed deep institutional roots and wide public awareness.
Biobanks emerged in the early 2000s, as organized collections of anonymized DNA samples that can be used to foster important public purposes. Both types of biobank offer benefits-helping to determine guilt for criminal acts and to exonerate those wrongly convicted, or helping to discover the etiology of genetic diseases and to develop effective cures.
They also share risks--violations of individual privacy; imposition on the donor or lack of meaningful informed consent; human error in cataloguing and using the data; racial, ethnic, class, and gender over-and under-inclusion; and administrative failures of coordination, transparency, management, and control. As the fourth epigraph shows, concerns about individual privacy predominated in these cases.
So far as we can tell, these cases were hardly ever mentioned in media beyond the individual states.
6 It is no surprise, then, that fewer than 1 percent of GKAP respondents have heard or read "a lot" about medical biobanks, fewer than 10 percent have heard or read "some," and approximately 70 percent have heard or read "nothing." 7 Nonetheless, as de Tocqueville would have expected, they express considerable optimism about this innovation they were just told about. 8 Ten percent "strongly support" and an additional 47 percent "somewhat support" federal funding of biobanks for research. 9 More pointedly, 45 percent judge medical biobanks "likely to do more good than harm to society," compared with only 9 percent who say the reverse. That is, among the 54 percent of respondents willing to make a substantive evaluation of a scientific innovation that they just learned about, 10 five times as many express optimism as pessimism. Most pointedly, just over 30 percent of GKAP respondents were willing to "contribute a DNA sample, for example by a swab from your mouth, for use in current or future scientific or medical research;" an additional 33 percent are somewhat willing. Only one fifth were flat-out "unwilling."
Now consider forensic biobanks. In an important sense, they are the same kind of scientific innovation as medical DNA databases; they are organized repositories of anonymized human biological material, including genomic information, that are designed to be used for important societal purposes. But their history, visibility, and political valence are very different.
Forensic biobanks were well established and widespread by the time of the GKAP survey. In 2011, 47 states collected mandatory DNA samples from all persons convicted of a felony (the other three collected samples only from convicted sex offenders; they have now expanded their purview). Fifteen states retrieved DNA from certain misdemeanants, 21 from some arrestees, and some states from persons on probation or parole, juveniles, and/or undocumented immigrants and others subject to deportation (all of these have now expanded to other states). Congress, states, and local governments had systematized laws and regulations for collection, storage, and links to a national database maintained by the FBI 11 of over 10 million offender profiles (now about 12 million). All three levels of government provided funds for labs and testing. 12 Institutional infrastructure for using forensic biobanks for exoneration was not as well developed, but laws and regulations for post-conviction DNA testing were emerging in most states.
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As both a cause and consequence of these substantial and growing institutional differences between medical and forensic DNA databases, one might expect differences in the Furthermore, as the epigraph from President Obama's television interview implies, prominent public officials promoted forensic biobanks during the 2000s; to our knowledge, none spoke against them. Attorney General Eric Holder, liberal governors of New York and Maryland, both Republican and Democratic members of Congress, and many others agreed that "the regular collection of DNA samples from federal arrestees and defendants must be a priority" (Markon 2010) . After the arrest of the man dubbed the Grim Sleeper, alleged to have murdered a dozen women, California's African American attorney general, Kamala Harris, provided funds to double the number of familial DNA searches for horrendous crimes and to reduce the DNA testing backlog for other criminal investigations. " 'This is a landmark case. This will change the way policing is done in the United States,' according to Los Angeles' police chief" (Sher and Karlinsky 2010) .
In short, DNA databases used in the criminal justice system are similar scientific innovations to DNA databases used in the medical arena, but their political and societal context are very different. They are established through law, publicly organized and funded, endorsed by virtually all politicians, and made prominent through one of the most popular television shows ever produced. No wonder that, after reading a definition, 20 percent of GKAP respondents claimed to have heard or read "a lot" about forensic biobanks, and another 35 percent had heard or read "some." Only one fifth knew "nothing."
If support for unmediated and unknown medical DNA databases was high, one might expect even greater support for the strongly institutionalized criminal justice DNA databases.
That is the case: fully 86 percent strongly or somewhat support increased federal funding (evenly divided between the two levels of enthusiasm), and only 4 percent strongly oppose it.
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And respondents are both more willing to take a position on the value of forensic biobanks than of medical ones, and to express optimism in that opinion. Table 1 enables the comparison: 15 Even more respondents endorse government regulation of forensic biobanks than of medical ones; over fourfifths do so (compared with almost two-thirds in the medical case) . Given that forensic biobanks are entirely governmental creations, this presumably means that respondents don't want them to be independent of oversight. As we noted above, the ratio of optimism to pessimism was 5 to 1 for medical DNA databases, with almost half opting out of any clear view; the ratio is an even healthier 8.5 to 1 in the criminal justice arena, with just over one third opting out.
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Interestingly, however, GKAP respondents are no more willing to contribute their own DNA sample to forensic than to medical biobanks; in both cases, about three fifths are willing or somewhat willing, and one fifth are not. Exploring why in both cases will deepen our understanding of the impact of institutionalization.
Getting Below Top-line Results: Institutionalization and Variations in Opinion
So far we have shown that, if genomic science can be generalized, Americans have a bias toward optimism about scientific or technological innovation even when they know nothing at all about the innovation itself. We have also shown that when an innovation is institutionalized rather than unmediated, especially when elites are unanimously supportive, levels of scientific 16 Despite the deep implications of genomic science for matters of life and death, normative and religious arguments play little role in explaining Americans' optimism about biobanking. We randomly split the GKAP sample so that half were asked about religious and half about moral influences on their views of biobanks. We found little impact in either case. More than seven-tenths of respondents reported that their views on medical biobanks have "nothing to do with [their] religious beliefs;" the proportion was the same for legal biobanks. Almost three-fifths said their views about medical biobanks had nothing to do with their "moral values," while half said the same about legal biobanks. Among those for whom religion or morality was related to biobanking, in all four instances at least twice as many saw biobanking as fitting within rather than conflicting with their religious or moral values. or technological optimism rise. Public accord with a unified elite is not, of course, a new finding (Zaller 1992 ), but it does not always obtain (Zaller 1998 Nonetheless, we do find some partisan differences among GKAP respondents: as table 2 shows, Democrats are absolutely and relatively more enthused about medical DNA databases, whereas Republicans are absolutely and relatively more enthused about criminal justice DNA databases. 17 Next iteration: systematic evidence for those statements Those results imply the first refinement of the broad term, "institutionalization," which we have defined so far only implicitly. Up to this point, institutionalization has involved a systematic and wide ranging set of interlocking databases across levels of government; support from virtually all public officials; multiple rounds of public funding; and years of media prominence. Those characteristics distinguish forensic from medical biobanks and arguably explain Americans' even higher levels of technology optimism about the former compared with the latter. Explaining results beneath these toplines requires us to invoke another institutionpartisanship, or more particularly the beliefs and values implied by the terms "Republican" and "Democrat."
Republicans and Democrats differ in their level of trust in various elite actors who will be using or managing the scientific innovations of DNA databases. Figure 1 shows the results, which should not surprise any reader: Democrats are more likely to trust (or less likely to mistrust) scientists and government officials to use biobanks wisely than are Republicans, who are more likely to trust private companies, police officers, and judges and juries. Medical biobanks ratio is below one for both sets of partisans on government officials and private companies; more respondents mistrust than trust them.
Responses to the open-ended query of why respondents would (not) be willing to contribute to a medical biobank reinforce our claim that the institution of generic partisanship shapes responses to a totally novel question. Democrats said, for example:
 "If it would enable the medical field to come up with cures, that would be good. If it led to health companies denying coverage, then it would not be a good idea."
 "Perhaps the DNA can be used to stop Alzheimer's Disease (that affects people in my family). I would like scientists to work to help people that suffer from inherited diseases."
 "if my dna was to help them find a cure or just to simply cure me or other relatives, or even if it helps to be a stepping stone to discover positive results, i would be ok with it."
Or simply,  "why not ?"
Many Republicans made similar comments-"If it helps determine how disease to the body and mind can be eliminated and allow people to live healthy linve, why would'nt I?" And some Democrats were highly skeptical-"feel like that is infringing on my privacy." But Republicans more commonly observed, for example:
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 "what ever i am is just none of your business."
 "I do not beleive the government acts in the best interest of the people. Look at many cases over the years (std to black men). Private research because finding a cure will pay."
 "Because I no longer trust the government, or politican, or banks, or just about any institution. Period."
 "I have no problem letting research read my DNA as long as the Government stays the hell out of regulation, funding and controlling the research. If it is worth studing some private industry will fund and do the reserch."
With regard to forensic DNA databases, Democrats and Republicans were almost equally optimistic. But the former were more likely to refer to exoneration or a finding of not guilty, while the latter focused more on the role of DNA in conviction. Again, these are tendencies rather than bright lines; comments nonetheless do a good job of revealing of the structure of partisan policy views. Thus, Democrats:
 "I don't see how it could hurt me and it may help someone wrongly convicted of a crime, or help rightfully convict someone."
 "I feel like this system is being put in place in order to further stigmatize people who may have been abused by the penal justice system."  "To make sure justice is served."
 "If it would generally help deter criminal acts and make society safer, I would be willing to submit DNA sample"
 "in order to help the police."
And finally,  "get your swabs out of my face!" 19 The respondent is white. 20 The respondent is black. As one would expect from the topline and partisan results, table 3 shows much more optimism than pessimism about both innovations, and especially strong enthusiasm for databases in the criminal justice arena, among respondents at all points on the ideological scale -with two exceptions. Conservatives, and especially extreme conservatives, are notably less optimistic and more pessimistic about medical biobanks, and extreme conservatives even break from other conservatives as well as from liberals in their caution about forensic biobanks. The ratio of optimism to pessimism falls steeply for the two most conservative groups in the medical arena, and is dramatically lower for extreme conservatives in the forensic arena.
Medical and Forensic Biobanks-the Impact of Ideology on
The same pattern of results obtain with regard to willingness to contribute a DNA sample to a scientific or criminal justice database. Figure 2 shows the results: 
Medical biobanks Forensic biobanks
Note first that compared with conservatives as a whole, higher proportions of liberals as a whole trust than mistrust scientists, government officials, and judges and juries. Twice as many conservatives mistrust as trust government officials, which is not the case among liberals, and twice as many in both ideological camps mistrust as trust private companies to work for the public good in the arena of genomics biobanking. On average, liberals and conservatives differ little in the relative proportions who trust and mistrust police officers.
It is not surprising that liberals, like Democrats (with whom they overlap, though the categories are not identical) 21 to be relatively trusting of scientists, government officials, and even judges and juries. The more interesting and novel results occur within the finer-grained ideological distinctions, especially among respondents who identify as "extremely conservative." Extreme conservatives are much more likely to mistrust, and much less likely to trust, all five sets of institutional actors than is any other group, including "conservatives." They are especially distinctive with regard to police officers' and judges and juries' use of forensic biobanks; whereas two and a half to four times as many conservatives trust as mistrust these protectors of law and order, almost as many extreme conservatives mistrust as trust them.
Extreme conservatives are deeply mistrustful of (unspecified) government officials, to no surprise, and also of scientists and, surprisingly, private companies.
We interpret these results as a global response to institutions, or perhaps institutionalization -without much concern about the nature of the institution, its role as a 21 2715 GKAP respondents identify as Democrats, but only 1331 as liberals. In contrast, 1364 GKAP respondents are Republicans and 1388 are conservatives. Of the Democrats, 16% identify as "slightly liberal," 23% as "liberal," and 5% as "extremely liberal;" of the Republicans, 20% identify as "slightly conservative," 38% as "conservative," and 8% as "extremely conservative." public or private actor, or its goal. Extreme conservatives tend to mistrust all institutional actors, regardless of who they are and what they do; although we have no direct evidence on the point, we see them as libertarians. Open-ended responses show this stance dramatically.
With regard to medical biobanks:
 "Government invasion of my Privacy"
 "Because the government has no need of my DNA and needs to STOP trying to control everything!"
 "snoop. snoop. snoop. it's bad enough that companies keep track of my shopping information just so that I can save a nickel on a bar of soap."
 "I would expect that the samples would eventually be used for some nefarious purpose. and do not support government funding or regulation of many so called "well intended" projects."
With regard to forensic biobanks:
 "Independent research is different from a Government identification system. I would donate to private, but not government data/bio banks."
 "STOP GOVERMENT FROM USING PERSONAL INFORMATION FOR NO REASON ---WE ARE NOT CRIMINALS"
 'I do not want to be in the "system." '  "I do not think anyone needs my DNA to find out who is innocent or guilty. If they want to research DNA why don't they use their own or the governments. Enough is enough with the government wanting United States Citizens to do something they themselves wou[ld not do]"
Again, these are, so far, examples rather than the results of systematic coding--but they could be multiplied many times; the privacy or anti-institutional frame occurs in a disproportionately large share of the extreme conservatives' explanations of their views of biobanks. They are not, like other conservatives, inclined to trust the institutions of law and order-judges and juries, police officers-or to be optimistic about the societal impact of forensic DNA databanks.
Similarly, they are not, like other conservatives, inclined to endorse the institution of scientific research or to express optimism about the Rorschach test of medical biobanks. A plurality or majority of Americans see reasons to endorse scientific and technological innovations, especially in the arena of criminal justice; extreme conservatives see dangerous and encroaching institutions.
Medical and Forensic Biobanks-the Impact of Race and Ethnicity on Optimism:
Classifying respondents by race or ethnicity enables a third refinement of the topline results, and further clarifies the role of institutions in shaping optimism or pessimism about scientific innovation.
The key evidence appears in table 3: Blacks are noticeably less optimistic than members of the other three groups about 22 A slightly higher proportion of Latinos than of the other groups express pessimism about the societal uses of medical biobanks. This calls for further investigation, especially since in the eight iterations of the GSS since 2000 that permit one to distinguish Hispanics from nonHispanics, the former were more likely than Blacks or nonHispanic Whites to express a great deal of confidence in the medical establishment (the proportions are, respectively 45.2 percent, 37.2 percent, and 39.9 percent). If we shift our focus to Whites, we see that they are more likely to express optimism and less likely to express pessimism about societal uses of forensic biobanks than are members of all other groups. As a result, their optimism-to-pessimism ratio (in table 3 ) is twice as great as that of the next most optimistic group, Asians. A parallel disparity does not hold in the case of medical biobanks. It seems reasonable to infer, therefore, that Whites are using the same institutional stereotypes in the medical arena as other groups are, but that they are using their history or expectations of much more positive experience with criminal justice institutions when they consider forensic DNA databases.
Results from GKAP queries about willingness to contribute to a biobank and trust in the elite actors managing them reinforce the finding that both Whites and African Americans are using their institutional knowledge in responding to questions about forensic biobanking.
Consider willingness to contribute first, with the crucial evidence in figure 5 . This figure is easily interpreted. A higher proportion of Blacks are unwilling than are willing to contribute to either type of biobank, a result that does not obtain in any other group.
As we saw with regard to ideology, the data on trust show in more detail why African
Americans differ from other groups in their optimism about and willingness to participate in biobanking. They do not trust any of the institutional actors who will be manipulating the DNA samples. Figure 6 includes the crucial evidence. For full results, see appendix A5.
The ratio of trust to mistrust among members of all four groups is greater for the institutions of scientific research, the judicial system, and even the police than it is for the generic public and private sectors. Whites (blue bars) and Asians (green bars) are more inclined to trust or less inclined to mistrust than are Blacks (red bars) and Latinos (beige bars). What is most striking, however, and most important for our purposes, are the distinctive views of African Americans. They are dramatically less inclined to trust or more inclined to mistrust three out of the five institutions; the only reason they cannot be distinctive with regard to the generic public and private sectors is that there is no room to drop further. GKAP respondents' own explanations for why they would or would not be willing to contribute a DNA sample to a databank reinforce the portrait we are developing of American Blacks' unusually low levels of scientific optimism because of high levels of mistrust of most major institutional actors. As before, these comments are illustrative rather than systematic, and one can find the opposite observations. But they are, nonetheless, revealing, as well as typical. First, Blacks' views of medical biobanks:
 "Because I don't know what kind of research they would be doing especially since the government has not done their job explaining biobanks."
 "Dna once taken and put in the system could do harm later in life."
 "I don't trust many big companies or organizations to really believe in their mission."
Next, Blacks' views of forensic biobanks:
 "I don't trust the police, lawyers, prosecutors, or judges do do the right thing (check the innonence project websight-look at Dallas Texas those wrongly convicted-and the State of Illinois death row innoncent people-to see what I mean)."
 "sometimes the government agencies collecting might use this dna against the innocent person!"
 "Because the government would mess it up and I'd be in jail for something I didn't do. "
 "Since my knowledge of this subject is limited and my knowledge of the juctice system is biased, I wouldn't be willing."
As yet another respondent put it, "Trust is the factor. Once your DNA is out who knows what a person would do. Saying if it got in the wrong hands." That puts it in a nutshell-trust is indeed the factor. We would modify this comment only by substituting "institution" or "structure" for "person," and we have the core explanation for why African Americans, like extreme conservatives, differ so much from other groups in their level of scientific or technology optimism in the genomics arena.
Ideas and Institutions
Although some Black respondents identify as extreme conservatives (and also as Democrats), the overlap between the two categories is small. Only eighteen black respondents ( The old cliché about politics making strange bedfellows is entirely apt for these two groups'
response to the scientific innovation of DNA-based biobanks.
This result suggests the complexity of the nascent politics around developing and deploying genomic science; genomics may eventually rival evolution and global warming as the focus of polarized views with huge societal impact. That is the topic for a different paper; in the meantime, we can use views on aspects of genomics to probe the hoary analytic question of how institutions and ideas relate to one another. Despite the fact that medical biobanks had no institutional presence in 2011 in the eyes of virtually all Americans--and despite being offered the escape hatch of "equal amounts of good and harm"-almost half of GKAP respondents expected them to provide societal benefits; five times as many offered the optimistic as the pessimistic prediction (table 1) . We treat those results as a baseline measure of the diffuse technological optimism that de Tocqueville noted close to two centuries ago. Forensic biobanks, in contrast, had a deep, broad, and visible institutional presence in the lives, or at least television sets, of Americans by 2011. Fully 58 percent of GKAP respondents expected them to provide societal benefits, and 8.5 times as many offered the optimistic as the pessimistic prediction. That additional 13 percentage points of optimism-almost one third more than the baseline for medical biobanks-or the almost doubling of the optimism-topessimism ratio, can be understood as a measure of the impact of institutionalism beyond vague initial views.
Comparing Republicans and Democrats provides a different measure of the interaction between ideas and institutions. Given that both sets of partisans were equally ignorant about medical biobanks, the gap between Democrats' optimism-to-pessimism ratio of 7.0 and Republicans' corresponding ratio of 3.7 for medical biobanks (table 2) , provides a measure of the impact of partisan institutions on a cognitive vacuum. The parallel question about legal biobanks-which were institutionalized and equally well understood by members of both parties-yielded little difference between the optimism-to-pessimism ratios of Democrats The nature and extent of institutional embeddedness helps to shape citizens' level of optimism or pessimism about scientific innovations. But the innovation's institutional embeddedness is itself embedded in other institutions ranging from political parties to racial hierarchies. And the role of all of those institutions may differ in different national contexts.
Medical and legal biobanks are themselves deeply important; they also offer a window into perennial questions of the interactions between structures and ideas.
25 Eighty-one percent of Icelanders had heard of medical biobanks. Across all 14,200 European respondents, the correlation between having heard of medical biobanks and willingness to participate was 0.26 (p < 0.01). We cannot infer causation in either direction here. 
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